REPORT OF THE JOINT PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE, HOME AFFAIRS, SECURITY AND WAR VETERANS AFFAIRS AND THEMATIC COMMITTEE ON PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE STATUS OF BORDER POSTS
HON. MAONEKE: I move the motion standing in my name that this House considers and adopts the report of the Joint Portfolio Committee on Defence, Home Affairs, Security Services and War Veterans Affairs and Thematic Committee on Peace and Security on the Status of Border Posts in relation to Border Security Governance.
HON. MAPIKI: I second.
HON.MAONEKE:
1.0 Introduction:
There was a general outcry regarding smuggling of goods and precious minerals, human trafficking, document processing delays, rampant corruption, widespread illicit activities and security breaches and illegal crossing into and out of the country at various border posts. This has resulted in the Government losing taxes and duties accordingly, hence impacting negatively on economic development.
Various stakeholders, including civil societies and the media, testified that there was a need for the Government to act immediately and address these trepidations. Effective border security governance ensures the safe and legal movement of people, goods and services while preventing smuggling, trafficking, illicit activities and unauthorised crossing, recognising the importance of water-tight border posts to the country’s development agenda.
The Joint Portfolio Committee on Defence, Home Affairs, Security Services and War Veterans’ Affairs and Thematic Committee on Peace and Security conducted an inquiry into border post security from 7 to 14 April 2025.
2.0 Objectives.
2.1 To assess existing measures for securing border posts and addressing irregular migration, human trafficking, smuggling and other illicit activities.
2.2 To identify challenges faced by security agencies in executing their duties at border posts.
2.3 To formulate recommendations for enhancing border security governance.
3.0 Methodology
The inquiry employed the following methods in gathering data and information.
3.1 The Committee interviewed the following witnesses on Tuesday, 4 March 2025: Ambassador R. Faranisi, Secretary for Home Affairs and Cultural Heritage; Mr. L. Ncube, Deputy Commissioner General of Police and Ms. R. Gono, the Chief Director for Immigration, on status, challenges and strategies being employed to secure border posts.
3.2 It analysed written submissions from members of the Joint Operation Command, the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) and the Airports Company of Zimbabwe and noted several existing gaps as well as challenges being faced by security agencies in securing border posts, which prompted the need for the Committee to verify the facts on the ground.
3.3 Conducted site visits to Beitbridge, Plumtree, Mlambapele, Binga, Victoria Falls, Nyamapanda, Sango, Mt. Selinda, Forbes, Chirundu, Mukumbura Border Posts and Victoria Falls International Airport to get first-hand information on the ground.
3.4 Requested the company of senior security officers to accompany the Committee during the visits and respond to issues that require a person of a higher position in rank to respond. The Committee was accompanied by the following senior security officers: Mr. M. Chifamba, Mr. T. Zizhou from the Office of the President and Cabinet, Colonel R. Muhambi, Colonel T. Chikungwa from the Zimbabwe Defence Forces Headquarters, Chief Superintendent R. Mafoko from the Zimbabwe Republic Police Headquarters and Mr. A. Chinyemba from the Zimbabwe Border Management Authority.
3.5 All gathered evidence was analysed and deliberated upon, forming the basis of this report.
4.0 Committee Findings. Measures Adopted to Secure National Borders.
4.1 Immigration Department
4.1.1 Online Border Management System (OBMS) The Secretary for Home Affairs and Cultural Heritage, Ambassador R. Faranisi, informed the Joint Committee that the Immigration Department is responsible for administering immigration laws, overseeing entry and exit procedures, processing permits and enforcing compliance measures such as deportations and refusals of entry. He stated that the department is rolling out a modern Online Border Management System (OBMS) across all border posts, integrating ports of entry/exit and creating a biometric database to enhance security.
Additionally, he reported that drones were being deployed for real-time surveillance, aimed at curbing illegal crossings and smuggling. He highlighted that border post authorities had established bilateral coordination efforts, culminating in Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and joint borderline and inland patrol operations to address irregular migration.
4.1.2 The Committee was also informed that major border posts like Beitbridge, Chirundu and Forbes manage an average of 12 000 travellers daily, increasing to 28 000 during peak periods.
4.2 Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and the Secretary for Home Affairs referenced Section 219 of the Constitution, outlining the ZRP’s role in crime detection, investigation and national security enforcement. He explained that smuggling routes vary at all the border posts. Most of the smuggled goods such as second-hand clothing enter via Manicaland and Matabeleland and pharmaceutical products through Mashonaland West and Matabeleland North. Furthermore, he indicated that stock theft is particularly rampant along Zimbabwe’s borders, affecting regions near Mlambapele, Binga and Mukumbura, where stolen livestock is transported across borders.
With regards to human trafficking, it was reported that the issue is rampant in Mashonaland East, Matabeleland South and Manicaland, with migrants mainly originating from Somalia, Ethiopia and the DRC. Incidents of human trafficking were very difficult to identify and in most cases, those being trafficked volunteer themselves to give false information to security agencies at border posts, especially when they do not have proper travel documents.
4.2.1 Joint border patrol operations, Deputy Commissioner General L. Ncube, informed the Committee that the ZRP has strengthened drone and CCTV surveillance systems to monitor activity within the border and along the borderline. He further added that officers usually conduct routine border patrols and joint operations with neighbouring countries to tackle illicit activities. He noted that simultaneous regional operations under the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Organisation (SARPCCO) and Eastern Africa Regional Police Chiefs Organisation (EARPCCO) have proven effective, alongside the Zimbabwe Republic Police’s ‘No to Illegal Cross-Border Crimes’ initiative conducted in 2023 and 2024.
Table 1: Statistics of arrests during Operation ‘No to illegal cross border crimes’: 2023/2024 Nature of Crime Number of arrests in Year 2023. Smuggling Number of arrests in Year 2024 14751. Illegal crossing 12707 8251 1714 6 Drug trafficking 134 35 Illicit dealings and Human trafficking 73 44 Cattle rustling 623 717. The Committee noted a notable decrease in most crimes such as illegal crossing, smuggling and drug trafficking from the period 2023 to 2024. The decline in these case could indicate effective law enforcement, successful joint operations and increased public awareness. However, persistent increase in cattle rustling cases indicates that this crime remains a challenge requiring sustained attention and effort.
Table 2 .0 Value of smuggled items recovered from January to February 2025 Place Value recovered Beitbridge Border Post Nyamapanda Border Post USD184 963,78; Chirundu Border Post USD23 936,78; Mt. Selinda Border Post USD40 525,65; Mphoengs Border Post USD18 248,69; Plumtree Border Post USD1 448,22; Victoria Falls Border Post USD1 756,00; total USD271 022, 34.
The substantial value of recovered goods at Zimbabwe`s border posts underscores the importance of robust border security measures in combating cross-border crimes. The recovery of goods worth thousands of dollars demonstrates the effectiveness of efforts to secure borders and prevent smuggling.
4.2.2 Trade Facilitation Technologies
The implementation of electronic pre-clearance systems, single window trade platforms, Cargo Tracking Systems, mobile scanners, Canine Units, Risk Management Systems and aerial drone surveillance reflects a comprehensive security and efficiency approach by leveraging technology and multi-layered security measures to enhance border management.
These integrated systems facilitate efficient risk assessment, real-time monitoring and targeted interventions, thereby streamlining legitimate trade while strengthening detection and prevention capabilities against contraband, smuggling and other security threats.
- 2. 3 Sustained deployment Continuous deployment of military and police personnel at strategic Forward Operational Bases ensures visible security. Both the Army and the Zimbabwe Republic Police have established forward bases 10 kilometers apart along the border lines to enhance border security. By locating strategically 10km from one another, security personnel can effectively deter, intercept illegal activities, conduct real-time monitoring, proactive operations and swift response to security breaches.
CRITICAL CHALLENGES IMPEDING BORDER SECURITY GOVERNANCE.
Despite these efforts, several significant challenges hinder effectiveness;
4.4 Infrastructure Deficit
Most border posts were designed for lower traffic volumes. The current infrastructure is inadequate to handle increased trade and migration, leading to overcrowding, insufficient facilities and operational bottlenecks. The Committee noted with concern the infrastructure gap in terms of commercial offices, inspection bays, office space, housing, toilets, bridge development, water supply, information and communication technology and software as well as surveillance technology.
At Forbes, Nyamapanda, Plumtree and Mukumbura, the Committee discovered that the infrastructure which was constructed to cater for fewer people back then, has now outlived its purpose. With only one side catering for both entry and exit passages, congestion of both human and vehicular movement was imminent. Long-winding queues of heavy commercial trucks were seen stretching further down to the other side at these borders. There was also an acute shortage of office space, resulting in some offices being used as both offices and store rooms. At Mlambapele, Mt. Selinda and Binga Border Posts, they were using a small mental container for the office, health facilities as well as social amenities like toilets.
8 4.5 Access roads, poor conditions of access roads to border posts impede logistical support and response times. The Committee noticed that the conditions of roads at Sango, Mount Selinda, Mukumbura, Nyamapanda, Chirundu, Mlambapele, Maitengwe and Victoria Falls were in a sorry state. This, as a result, increases the costs and limits accessibility. A suggestion was made for the government to construct road infrastructure along the borderline to facilitate easy movement and smooth patrols.
4.6 Absence of Borderline Track Decades of neglect have rendered the colonial-era border patrol road unusable, hindering joint security patrols, affecting rapid response and patrol effectiveness. Although drone surveillance exists, a lack of ground access limits timely responses, contrasting with neighbouring countries that maintain border roads. The Bhinya Road, a critical military track encircling Zimbabwe, was last serviced 30 years ago and is no longer accessible.
Furthermore, the existence of land mines at some parts of the borderline made ground patrols impractical.
4.7 Patrol Vehicles and Logistical Challenges.
The Committee was informed that there were no off-road terrain vehicles available for border patrol operations. During a tour of the Binga and Mlambapele border posts, it was disheartening to learn that key departments such as the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), Immigration, ZIMRA and the President’s Department lacked operational vehicles and were heavily reliant on Army vehicles for patrols, an arrangement deemed unsustainable given the rampant illegal activities along the borderline.
In contrast to their Zambian counterparts, Binga station reported having no boat to patrol Lake Kariba, a common route for border jumpers. The stretch between border posts ranges from a minimum of 200km (Beitbridge-Tuli) to over 500km (Forbes-Nyamapanda), further complicating enforcement efforts. Additionally, fuel shortages were reported to hamper border operations as most fuel vendors near border areas sell in foreign currency (USD), yet departments continue to receive minimal fuel allocations. For instance, at Sango, Mount Selinda and Chirundu, departments requiring 500 litres of fuel per month receive only 80 litres, severely restricting their ability to conduct patrols and random checks.
4.8 Endemic Border Porosity
Lack of physical or natural barriers, especially along the border line exacerbates smuggling and illicit crossings. At Beitbridge Border Post, the Committee noted that the 225-kilometer frontier had too many breach points whilst border policing covers less than 50km, leaving a large stretch unmonitored. The de-mining exercise that had been going on was said to have compounded the situation since previously inaccessible areas were now open to evaders and smugglers who were taking advantage of the safe passage.
At Sango Border Post, the 200-kilometers stretch is also porous to illegal crossing. The main access points that are mostly used for smuggling goods in and out include Crooks Corner, Machichi, Dumela, Malipati and Dingi, among others. This posed potential security risks to the country at the same time undermining revenue collection efforts.
4.9 Accommodation
While the completion of cluster houses for staff at Beitbridge border post marks a positive development of living conditions for some border personnel, accommodation challenges persist at many other border posts. Accommodation challenges severely impact personnel from Immigration, Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), Port Health, and Plant Quarantine. Personnel from these vital agencies often endure substandard living conditions, resorting to temporary solutions such as cabins and tents without electricity.
In contrast, ZIMRA officials were alleged to be well-catered for by their authority in terms of accommodation and other benefits. The situation at Nyamapanda Border Post exemplifies this challenge, with officials reporting both a scarcity of staff accommodation and the dilapidated state of existing infrastructure.
In some severe instances, officers, including those living with their families, are compelled to share rooms further compromising their living standards. At Chirundu Border Post, staff pay rent for their accommodation. This situation affected the working morale of employees, thereby hindering effective and efficient service delivery.
4.10 Shortage of Staff
Staff shortages have been largely necessitated by accommodation challenges at all border posts. The situation has made it difficult for regional managers to deploy officers to these sites. At Mlambapele, Immigrations deploy one officer per month on rotation, who shares the existing small cabin with ZRP as a store room and bedroom whilst ZIMRA deployed one officer who commutes every day a distance of 80km to and from the border.
The Committee noted that 10 shortage of critical staff at these border posts may result in delayed responses to security breaches and weakening enforcement. Chirundu Border Post requires 10 additional immigration officers and ZIMRA needs seventy-seven more personnel, but accommodation shortages hinder recruitment.
4.11 Delayed implementation of Integrated Online Border Management System (OBMS)
The Committee found partial implementation of OBMS and limited drone deployment, hindering modernisation efforts. Sango Border Post, despite receiving equipment in 2024, lacks full installation and drone surveillance, leaving security gaps. Beitbridge, Chirundu, and Forbes have operational OBMS systems though power outages affect efficiency. Mukumbura, Mount Selinda, and Sango still lack drones, limiting security monitoring.
4.12 Old equipment and operational resource gap
A shortage of critical equipment such as compromises searching effectiveness. Scanners, CCTV and explosive detection machines. The existing equipment is now old and has become unserviceable, a situation that is forcing security agencies to rely on manual searches. At Victoria Falls International Airport, the Committee was informed that there were no explosives detection machines to use for the detection of explosive substances, which in most cases are used by terrorists. This poses a security and safety risk to travellers. A call was made for the Government to urgently purchase explosives detection machines at all airports.
4.13 Conditions of Service
Cognisant of the fact that ZIMRA is a parastatal whose conditions of service are determined by a Board of Directors, while Immigration is a department in the Ministry of Home Affairs and Cultural Heritage whose conditions of service were determined by the Public Service Commission (PSC), Immigration officers complained that their counterparts in ZIMRA were receiving perks which were much higher than theirs. They hinted that ZIMRA staff enjoyed benefits such as car loans for managers every five years, out-of-station allowances, overtime and union representation. Unlike their counterparts, Immigration officers did not enjoy these incentives despite being the face of the nation. They are the first point of contact in the country for all travellers, including diplomats. The Immigration Department’s essential services cluster was reported to be lagging in terms of conditions of service despite having a staff establishment of less than 600 nationwide.
The least paid Immigration officer at the border is earning a salary of USD160 plus ZiG116.00 per, eleven months without any allowance. In contrast, the least paid ZIMRA officer is earning on average USD750, inclusive of salary and allowances. This pay gap may impact morale and job satisfaction, potentially tempting officers to engage in corrupt activities to supplement their income.
4.14 Absence of Border Post Management Authority
The Committee found out that due to the absence of a recognised Border Management Authority, ZIMRA which is a stakeholder, was given the maintenance and repair budget for the entire ports of entry and exit premises. The main grievances were that the arrangement was untenable since most of the expenditure was said to be in the interests of ZIMRA at the expense of other departments at border posts. In the absence of the arbitrator in the form of the Border Management Authority, this created a ‘Big Brother’ element and an unfair distribution of resources since other departments had no administrative say in the management of infrastructure and some services at border posts.
4.15 Transboundary Community Complexities
Traditional social ties and shared community resources and social amenities facilitate cross-border movement and complicate security enforcement. Local communities sometimes aid illicit activities for economic reasons. These strong socio-cultural connections between communities across borders, especially in areas like Plumtree, Binga, Nyamapanda, Sango, Mount Selinda, Mukumbura and Forbes pose significant challenges to border security.
Moreover, governance at the border is also complicated by unclear traditional and administrative boundaries. For instance, at Forbes Border Post, Chief Musikavanhu’s traditional authority extends into Mozambique which affects the enforcement of security measures. In addition, Mozambican farm workers commuting daily to Tanganda Estates and students from Mozambique and Botswana crossing into Forbes and Plumtree for school.
4.16 High cost of passport fees
The increase in passport fees was also noted as a significant factor contributing to the rise in illegal border crossings. Many people cannot afford the steep expenses involved in obtaining a passport, thereby resorting to illegal means. Currently, the fee for an ordinary passport stands at USD150 with an additional USD20 application fee. While an emergency passport costs USD250 as well as a USD20 application fee. A suggestion was made for Treasury to consider reducing passport fees to a lower price.
5.0 Observations
From the findings above, the Committee made the following observations;
5.1 That the absence of a specific authority that takes responsibility on all management issues, currently handled by ZIMRA, derailed service delivery in the Immigration Department at border posts
5.2 Majority of the border posts are lagging in the utilisation of modern technology such as drones, surveillance cameras, biometric cameras at clearance points and helicopters for effective operation, patrols and security surveillance at border posts. Criminals were therefore taking advantage of this lag to paralyse operational systems of the department and thereby smothering effective service delivery at all levels.
5.3 The absence of a harmonised or Integrated Border Management System (IBMS) affected the smooth flow of business in the Immigration Department at border posts. The adoption of the IBMS would inevitably standardise conditions of service and boost morale among workers;
5.4 The country’s borders were very porous as evidenced by the proliferation of illegal exit and entry points. The rise in illegal border crossing cases impacted negatively national security and loss of revenue to the nation.
5.5 There was limited working space at most of the border posts (with senior officers sharing offices with junior staff or using storerooms as offices), while offices and staff accommodation required immediate refurbishment at almost all the border posts visited. This hurt the welfare of personnel at border posts who happen to be the face of the nation.
5.6 Border control agencies did not have adequate all-terrain patrol vehicles to secure the entire country’s borderline. The Committee noted that securing the country’s borders was critical and there was urgent need to adequately and properly equip border security personnel for effective operation and patrol along the borderline.
5.7 There was very low morale among officers due to disparities in terms of conditions of service between ZIMRA and other departments at border post.
5.8 The Committee observed the need regular maintenance of the border patrol road to strengthen and boosts border security operations. Combined with drone technology, a functional border track will enable quick responses to threats.
5.9 The cost of obtaining an ordinary passport is too high as compared to other countries within the SADC region hence those who cannot afford it opt to cross illegally.
5.10. Inadequate infrastructure such as accommodation and office space, as well as social amenities like toilets, water, electricity and health facilities greatly affects staff at border posts.
5.11 The existence of land mines in some parts of the border posts poses a threat to human life and hinders ground border patrol operations.
6.0 Recommendations
To address these challenges, the Committee recommends that;
6.1 The Ministry of Home Affairs and Cultural Heritage should expedite the development of the Ports Authority Bill to create the National Ports Authority that will take responsibility as a unified operational body by 31 July 2026.
6.2 The Ministry of Home Affairs and Cultural Heritage should prioritise and ensure the installation of modern and state-of-the-art ICT facilities by 31 December 2025 to enable effective border patrols and surveillance. This should also include availing resources for integrated capacitation programmes for Immigration, Customs and security agents at border posts in the use of modern ICT and drones.
6.3 The Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion, in collaboration with other relevant ministries, should prioritise the establishment and operationalisation of an Integrated Border Management system at all border posts that involves the Immigration Department, Customs, Security Agents and various other stakeholders by 31 July 2026.
6.4 The Ministry of Public Works and National Housing should commence projects aimed at refurbishment of all border posts by 30 September 2025. This should be done with the OSBP concept in consideration. This should include construction and renovation of offices and staff accommodation at all the border posts.
6.5 In the 2026 National Budget, the Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion should capacitate the Immigration Department and the Zimbabwe Republic Police with operational vehicles to enable them to conduct regular checks and patrols along the borderline.
6.6 From 2026 onwards, the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructural Development, in collaboration with local authorities, should rehabilitate the Bhinya Road and establish a structured maintenance plan to enhance border patrol efficiency and security management. All roads leading to border posts should be regularly maintained to ensure smooth movement of goods as we as supporting regional trade integration.
6.7 The Ministry of Home Affairs and Cultural Heritage in consultation with the Public Service Commission and the Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion, should review and improve the remuneration and conditions of service for staff in the Immigration department. Frontline officers should be awarded incentives such as overtime and hardship allowances commensurate with those enjoyed by their counterparts in the various agencies operating at border posts.
6.8 The Government should accelerate infrastructure redevelopments, including road construction, weighbridges, staff housing, shopping malls, water supply systems and reliable electricity at all the border posts to promote economic growth and better living conditions that foster stability and job satisfaction. This can be done in a phased approach.
6.9 The Ministry of Home Affairs and Cultural Heritage, in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, should expand agreements on intelligence sharing, joint training, and coordinated patrols with neighbouring countries to counter smuggling, trafficking and other illicit dealings.
6.10 The Ministry of Finance and Investment Promotion should revise duty rates at border posts to a more competitive level, discouraging smuggling while boosting legal trade and tax revenue.
6.11 The Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion should prioritise funding towards the purchasing of explosive detection machine for the Victoria Falls International Airport, scanners, CCTV Cameras and drones at border posts by 31 December 2025
6.12 The Ministry of Health and Child Care should establish mobile health facilities at all border posts, including ZRP forward bases, to ensure easy access to health services for security personnel by 31 December 2025.
6.13 By December 2026, the Ministry of Defence, in collaboration Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion, and other relevant stakeholders, should prioritise demining efforts in all the infested areas along the border line to enhance patrol efficiency and security in affected areas.
6.14 With effect from January 2026, the Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion should allow the Immigration Department and ZIMRA to utilise retention funds to enhance services and infrastructure at border posts.
6.15 Going forward, Ministry of Local Government and Public works through local authorities, should develop settlements at border posts and other economic opportunities to reduce dependency on illicit activities and strengthen long-term stability. In fact, local authorities should be involved in the development of borders through servicing stands and other basic social amenities.
7.0 Conclusion
Informed by these pertinent observations, it is therefore the view of the Committee that, financial support, adequate tools of trade, decent working places, staff accommodation, advanced modern technologies, decent remuneration packages and various other requirements are key necessities to workers at all border posts.
Establishment of a Ports Authority, institutionalisation of an integrated Border Management System, digitalisation, upgrade and refurbishment of physical infrastructure to meet international best practices, among others, will indeed facilitate the improvement of service delivery in the Immigration Department. Being the face of the nation, the Committee implores the Government and all interested parties to expedite development programmes aimed at uplifting the standard of service delivery at all border posts.
The Committee hopes that the relevant authorities will seriously consider the recommendations made above to improve the situation prevailing at the border posts at the time of enquiry.
